THE NEW REPUBLIC

Some Hard Decisions

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The Wild Mixture

The Editors

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T.R.B. *from Washington*

Might As Well Enjoy It

★ We were a little ashamed of the lighthearted way in which we enjoyed the payola hearings. Frankly, the exchange of favors, kickbacks and bribes in American business is so universal that when we heard brash, articulate, highly-paid disc jockeys blandly admit to receiving thousands in hidden "listening fees" from record companies (whose product they are supposed to judge impartially) we couldn't get properly outraged. It struck us – we hate to say it – as amusing. Shocking? – yes, of course! The airwaves belong to you and me and theoretically could be used for some public good if the government, for example, would establish a federal radio chain like England's or Canada's. But what chance is there of that? Our society would much rather have moronic young men play moronic records for moronic school girls.

There comes a time when the obfuscation of a simple matter is so complete that one might as well enjoy it. Take payola. Everybody knows that that dirty little word is built right into American business. To pretend it is centered in radio alone is folly. Then again, the Oren Harris House committee is supposed to be examining the federal regulatory commissions. Payola is only a bypath. But a real inquiry is a dangerous job for politicians so the committee is shirking its basic job. Again, everybody knows that the payola and Van Doren scandals were due to the moribund state of the Federal Communications Commission. It has the authority to police radio-TV and has had it from the start. But individual commissioners were taking favors – payola – from the industry, too. Finally, there is dear Mr. Eisenhower. He expressed shock and dismay at payola at his press conference. Yet every member of the FCC he has either appointed or reappointed, which is true also of the Federal Trade Commission – another regulatory commission that has just come out of its Rip Van Winkle slumber.

To return to brighter things, one charming young disc jockey told of eking out a meager $40,000 salary with hard work and undercover payola of $15,000, from 15 "clients." Who could fail to be inspired by this lad's fine American will-to-succeed? Record manufacturers also threw a big convention for disc jockeys in Florida; the young ladies imported for the affair were reportedly of low fidelity and high frequency.

Will Eisenhower Veto Water?

★ Do you mind polluted drinking water – sewage, worms and things of that sort? It may just happen that Eisenhower's first 1960 veto will be the bill to raise present federal contributions to build local sewage disposal plants from $50 to $90 million annually. Not a large amount, but Eisenhower wants to cut it to $20 million and then drop it altogether. (It's a "local responsibility" and the government can't afford it.) He is supported by the NAM and US Chamber of Commerce, whose members fear restrictions on dumping industrial wastes into the nation's streams.

Pollution is a big problem. Urban population explodes: America's water supply remains constant. Every year streams become poisoned faster than we can purify them. We have now reached a crisis – it kills the fish but we drink it. Scientific reports on the subject are vivid but don't read them on a full stomach! Anyway, both houses of Congress have now passed an anti-pollution bill by big majorities and Eisenhower's veto is taken for granted.

Carpenters and Teachers

★ The Senate version of the education bill shocked Eisenhower last week; it provides federal aid for teachers' salaries as well as school construction. As it happens the House will probably knock the first feature out; Eisenhower interpreted it as federal direct aid to help pay "a local official." He said he couldn't "imagine anything worse for the federal government to get into." It is hard to see why it is all right for Washington to help pay wages of carpenters who build schools and not teachers who work in them.

It may be debated but this reporter concludes after some deliberation that the philosophical gap between Eisenhower and *any candidate of either party now running for the Presidency* (including Nixon) is greater than that between any two of the candidates themselves (including Nixon).

Developments on the political front: Hubert Humphrey scored a considerable triumph at the Albuquerque meeting of Western Democrats. . . . Eisenhower passed the farm buck to Congress, saying it was up to *them* to offer a satisfactory bill. . . . He also achieved a solid play in political gamesmanship by a quickie trip to Cape Canaveral with photographs before some missiles. . . . Lyndon Johnson is now on the spot on the civil rights bill where his position between North-South battle lines really commands sympathy. . . . And facetious suggestions continue here as to the kind of Vice President who would be most helpful to various candidates: Nixon, it is said, "needs a Mississippi nun who belongs to a trade union"; Kennedy would be balanced "by a Kansas farmer named Martin Luther."

Patrioteers Again

★ One thing Eisenhower has done in his incumbency is to put a lid on GOP isolationism and he deserves credit for it. We suspect isolationism is right there under the surface, however. When America joined the UN World Court it adopted an escape clause, the Connally Amendment. Other big nations followed suit and the result is that the Hague Court has decided only 13 cases in 13 years. It is a sorry spectacle for those who want international law to replace war. Hubert Humphrey now has a bill repealing the Connally Amendment and the Administration backs it – from Eisenhower on down. But the howl of isolationists and patrioteers is earsplitting. From the DAR to Midwest commentator Paul Harvey, the chorus is raised. What, yield sovereignty to an international court – ? Almost certainly the isolationists will block it; what's more, they are going on the warpath once again.

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6. The Washington Post

"The explosion lighted the desert and paled the full moon still visible in the morning sky. A mushroom cloud soared up in a wild mixture of colors – blinding white, violet and rose." And so, in the Sahara, ended the moratorium on atomic testing that had been in effect under a "gentlemen's agreement" between the US, the UK and the USSR since the fall of 1958. The French, eight years after having decided to produce an independent nuclear capability, exploded an atomic device. One bomb doesn't make a stockpile, and of itself this bomb has relatively little force, being comparatively small in impact and large in bulk. In its portent, however, the explosion is powerful enough to shake the foundations of Western defenses.

Was this "wild mixture of colors" over the desert necessary?

Given an inflexible bipartisan decision to keep what we have learned about nuclear weapons to ourselves and our insistence that the US must control the warheads of any nuclear arms turned over to NATO allies; given also the determination of France to acquire greater freedom of maneuver and the peculiarly proud character of Charles de Gaulle – the explosion *was* inevitable. In 1957, de Gaulle made it plain France would not be satisfied with anything less than full participation in the nuclear club. An Associated Press dispatch from Geneva in June, 1959, restated the obvious: "France wants to participate with the US in any decision on the use of nuclear weapons of war anywhere in the world. It would except a decision by the United States to use nuclear weapons in self-defense."

The State Department's reaction to the news from the Sahara was that it was "not unexpected," which indeed it was not. In July of last year, a *New York Times* report said that "State Department officials conceded that atomic cooperation with France posed a dilemma. The US, the officials said, is unwilling to enter into a more encompassing agreement that might assist France in becoming a fourth nuclear power. But as Ivan B. White, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, told the [Atomic Energy] committee: 'General de Gaulle specifically would not be satisfied with anything short of an agreement which would enable France to become a nuclear power'." Since no such agreement was ever seriously proposed by Washington, France has gone it alone and we must take our new bearings from that fact.

What may we expect now? First, the hand of de Gaulle is greatly strengthened, as will be shown when the General comes to this country in April. There will be more weight behind his demand for an exchange

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of nuclear information. The French breakthrough is also likely to stimulate the nuclear ambitions and efforts of other "nth powers" – from Sweden and Switzerland to Communist China. "Any country," we are told by a West German physicist, "that has sufficient electricity and the technology to make a good wrist watch" can produce an atomic bomb. That is an oversimplification, and an atomic bomb is not a hydrogen bomb, but it illustrates how illusory the notion is that nuclear weapons are a monopoly of a very few, very wealthy, highly-industrialized nations.

The French explosion likewise creates a new situation in NATO. It offers Europe the promise of decreasing dependence on the US; it suggests the possibility of increasing independence of action as Western Europe anticipates the emergence of a nuclear capability on the continent which is European-made and European-controlled. It puts the long and drawn-out Geneva talks on nuclear testing in a new perspective. For if the three nuclear powers have been equivocal about the effectiveness of any test ban in the absence of participation by Communist China (which does not yet have its A-bomb), what practical effect would a three-power treaty have without the participation of France which does? Even if the three powers could within the coming months agree to a limited ban, would they then have to enter into a second series of negotiations with de Gaulle?

Nuclear Self-Sufficiency

The goal of France, in the words of its Defense Minister, is "to give France a striking force equipped with nuclear warheads and the means of carrying them." The Chief of the French Special Weapons Division states that France aims to have "a completely modern nuclear arms supply." That goal is admittedly far-off; to reach it will take time and money, but it is no longer unattainable. Assuming that France continues to push forward, why not Germany? And if, in the absence of a common, pooled nuclear effort by the West, Bonn is put under tremendous pressure to develop its own nuclear capability, not only will the solidarity of the alliance be undermined, but the impact of that development on Soviet fears will be more serious. The Soviet reaction to the French explosion was one of "regret"; its reaction to the national nuclear rearmament of Western Germany would be far less restrained.

Moreover, the consequences of repeated French testing (and the French have made it clear that this is merely the first of a series) could widen the rift between Africa and Europe. Just when it appeared that a settlement in Algeria was in sight – a settlement compatible with Algerian aspirations and French security – the explosion in the Sahara has provoked outrage among the new nations of Africa with whom France, and the West as a whole, must live. The government of Ghana has frozen all French assets. There have been anti-French demonstrations across the world – from Japan to Cairo, Casablanca, London and West Berlin. The Communists have already begun to point self-righteously to de Gaulle's defiance of the UN Assembly's call on all nations, and France in particular, to refrain from further testing.

"If every country followed the example of France," says *Le Monde*," we would rapidly arrive at a mosaic of strictly national defense systems based on ruinously expensive atomic forces which by this very fact would open the door to subversion." This will not happen tomorrow, for it is estimated that France may require another decade before it has the capability of delivering a nuclear missile to enemy territory. But that fact is only encouraging if the delay is put to good use, if French policy is deflected, or even reversed, to the advantage of the West.

Whether that can be done depends on the US; more specifically, on the willingness of the Administration to attempt to persuade the Congress that the law under which nuclear weapons and information are kept from our allies is out-of-date. We are withholding in 1960 nuclear arms to our friends under circumstances very different from those that existed when we decided to discontinue our wartime nuclear cooperation with the United Kingdom. The alternative now to going it alone is going along together. The immediate alternative to mushrooming independent national nuclear capabilities is to risk the pooling of information and weapons. "Now the question," Paul Reynaud is quoted as saying, "is whether the Americans will help us take the second step forward." That step is nuclear cooperation that would make it unnecessary for France to go on testing.

Those to whom such a course is frightening, those like Rep. Chet Holifield who imply that French security can't be trusted and that US connivance in "spreading these terrible weapons in more and more hands" is intolerable, must explain how the spread can be prevented or made less dangerous, how standing pat will enhance Western security, how a dog-in-the-manger attitude by the US will discourage France and other nations from doing – at an extraordinary waste of national resources – what the US, the UK and the USSR have already done.

To bargain with the French now on these matters is not to concede everything. Bargaining means conditions. It is conceivable that only a fraction of the nuclear weapons that may be given France would be under national control, the remainder being under joint or US control; and for this exchange, it might be agreed that no nuclear weapons will be produced in France. It is also conceivable that a sharing of nuclear know-how and devices might modify French opposition to NATO missile bases on French territory and produce a more reasonable settlement of the dispute between France and NATO on the availability of the French fleet to NATO or the uses of air space over France for joint defense. Basically,

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the central questions posed by French policy are these: What can be done to avoid *promiscuous* diffusion of nuclear weapons, and, how can NATO be restored as an alliance of equals, by giving Europe on safe terms the use of weapons that have become – in the absence of international controls – an essential of self-defense? The US has no reason to fear French hegemony of Europe; and we ought to be clever enough to work out ways to turn over the capability in a manner which would fit into a strategy for the West while preventing an independent national use of these weapons. It is the US, and only the US, which is still in a position to make it unnecessary for France to test further. But we cannot apply that leverage under present laws, or if our thinking is muddled by old clichés of French unreliability, or by old delusions that the US is and will remain in the nuclear drivers seat.

Indecision in Washington

Is there any disposition in Washington to reconsider our policy of nuclear discrimination against France? The President's attitude is ambiguous. "When the Soviets have the information and the know-how to do things," he has said, "it's pretty hard for me to understand why we don't do something with our allies, as long as they themselves stand with us firmly in defending against the probable aggressive intent of Communism." And at the same press conference earlier this month, he said: "Where we are allied with other nations and we are trying to arm ourselves in such a way as to make certain of our defense we should try to arm them in such methods and ways as will make that defense more strong and more secure." Did he have France in mind? That was what some first thought. But if the President was sending up a trial balloon, it was very quickly shot down by the Administration.

It is alleged that the Congress would never agree to letting down the bars to admit France into the Western nuclear club. This fatalism assumes a lack of will and candor on the part of the Administration: If the policies required by new circumstances are clearly and convincingly explained, why would Congress not listen? But in order to put the case for sharing convincingly, we must return to some fundamentals.

In any limited war in Europe, a footing in France is essential. Nothing is so damaging to the Western defense posture and our chances of preventing aggressive Communist encroachments in Europe as to permit French and American opinion to become so mutually alienated that a negotiation of differences ceases to be possible and the integrity of NATO thereby becomes irreparably compromised. In association with Germany, France today is a great power. It understandably seeks a position of trust and authority alongside the US – comparable to that enjoyed by Great Britain. The administrative and control problems in NATO-izing nuclear weapons are complex and will not be easily worked out. But, if the will is there, hammering out the details of joint control is not beyond our ingenuity.

Can France be trusted? The more relevant question is: dare we say France cannot be trusted? It is provocative for us to be challenging the dependability of a key ally when our own increasing exposure to attack by long-range missiles makes our military support of Europe far more hazardous. It must also be exasperating to the French to hear us criticize them for doing what we, the Russians and the British have already done. And it is folly to set France apart when our developing bilateral relations with the Soviet Union are creating a fear that a deal might be made in Europe at the expense, or without the consent, of Europe.

It is necessary that there be a genuinely universal, enforceable agreement for controlling nuclear weapons. But the weapons cannot be uninvented and they are not under control today. And in the meanwhile, we must decide either to pool our nuclear know-how and devices or encourage a proliferation of independent capabilities. Surely the development of NATO as a nuclear power (which is what General Norstadt favors) is preferable and would facilitate a broader weapons control agreement than mounting competition among nations for independently-controlled nuclear weapons systems. The last two decades have seen technological changes – atomic energy, propulsion, electronics – which in aggregate give man an extraordinary increase in power over his environment. Any great nation can now translate these discoveries into reality – given the time, capital investment and scientific manpower. Unless we have the vision and will to find ways to control these innovations jointly, they can be the means of disrupting all that has been accomplished in uniting the West.

Toward Disarmament

Much has been written about the "lift" given to US diplomacy when the President assumed more personal responsibility for foreign affairs after the death of John Foster Dulles. What have been the results in one area – disarmament?

In May, 1959, it was agreed to set up a 10-nation, East-West disarmament commission. The date for its convening was left open.

On July 29, 1959, the President appointed Charles A. Coolidge, a Boston lawyer, to direct a review of "comprehensive and partial measures of arms control and reduction which, if internationally agreed, would contribute to the achievement of US national security objectives." The Coolidge Committee thereafter began its reappraisal of disarmament schemes and its search for a new formula. Meanwhile, Soviet planners were at

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work. In September at the UN, Khrushchev outlined three possible approaches: total disarmament to be achieved within four years; a plan for European security which would in effect neutralize the continent and nullify NATO; and a phased disarmament to include across-the-board reductions in armed forces, the end of all nuclear weapons testing, an agreement not to use these weapons except for purposes of defense sanctioned by the UN Security Council, and the dismantling of all military bases on the territories of other countries. How such agreements would be policed was not explained, though one month later, Mr. Khrushchev added that the Soviet Union accepted the principle of inspection: "Controllers will be on the territory of states from the very beginning of the process of disarmament up to its completion and also after the completion of disarmament so that not a single country could secretly prepare for war."

The US response to Mr. K's UN speech was cautious, general but not scornful. Mr. Herter said that it "must be taken very seriously." No US counter-proposal was then offered. The British rushed in to fill the gap by submitting some general recommendations to the UN immediately following Khrushchev's appearance.

On November 17, 1959, the President wrote Senator Humphrey of the need "to move effectively in the direction of disarmament." On December 3, he appointed Frederick Eaton, a New York lawyer, as chairman of this country's delegation to the forthcoming 10-power disarmament conference.

Toward the end of January, 1960, the Coolidge Report was said to have been completed, though it has not been published. In early February, the top disarmament officials of the five Western nations on the 10-nation Committee – the US, UK, France, Italy and Canada – met to work out a common position. They had planned to remain in Washington only a week. The opening days were spent discussing housekeeping details, British and French views, and possible gambits for replying to anticipated Soviet proposals. No American plan was available; the Americans had not made up their mind. The Coolidge Report was not discussed, since it was known to have become a matter of controversy within the Administration and was said to contain little more than a warmed-over version of past proposals for reducing conventional forces and minimizing the risks of surprise attack. The representatives of the other four Western powers waited. "The delay," reported *New York Times* correspondent Dana Adams Schmidt, "results from disagreements with ideas expressed in the so-called Coolidge Report."

"State and Defense Department officials, therefore," he wrote, "have started from scratch on working out a new program."

The 10-power disarmament negotiations are scheduled to begin the middle of next month. The Summit conference opens in Paris on May 16.

The President Goes Further

Republicans who accused the Senate majority of playing election year politics with education are right. The Senate has adopted a version of what was once the Murray-Metcalf bill which would provide about $20 per student in federal subsidies to state education budgets for each of the next two years. The money could be used for teachers' salaries or construction of elementary and secondary public schools, at the discretion of the states, and would total about $900 million annually, thus raising Uncle Sam's share of the nation's educational expenditures from about four percent to about 10 percent.

The bill could prove politically significant for several reasons. First, there are more than 1.3 million public school teachers, each of whom can vote – 12.9 percent of them have an annual wage of under $3,500; 42.8 percent are paid less than $5,000 a year. Second, Gallup polling suggests that, regardless of religion, politics and region, three out of four voters favor federal school aid. And perhaps most important, this is an issue on which the Vice President was forced to declare himself, defeating an earlier and more expensive version of the bill with his tie-breaking vote. This vote, one of only seven he has cast in the last seven years, could cost him dearly.

Yet, the Senate bill will almost certainly never become law. For one thing, it runs counter to the official position of the Roman Catholic hierarchy. This was pointed out last year by Cardinal (then Archbishop) Meyer of Chi-

"We Feel Deeply About Education – Here's a Book"

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cago in a letter to Senator Murray in which the Cardinal expressed the opposition of the National Catholic Welfare Conference to "the proposal that the federal government should subsidize teachers' salaries by means of financial grants." Individual Bishops subsequently endorsed this view in letters to Congressmen.

House Speaker Sam Rayburn also does not want a bill which makes federal funds available to raise teachers' pay, and he is not likely to use his influence to pry this one out of the House Rules Committee. And even if the House were to pass the bill, the President is committed to vetoing any measure which would cut so deeply into his carefully hoarded surplus. That is not, of course, the way the President puts it. Asked at his February 11 press conference whether he favored scaling down the $1.8 billion Senate figure, he replied: "Well, I'd go further than that. I say this: I do not believe the federal government ought to be in the business of paying a local official." Well, the federal government has been doing just that for nearly 100 years. The Morrill Act of 1862 provided federal grants to state colleges which could be spent at the discretion of local officials for classrooms, libraries *and* teachers' salaries. The Hatch Act of 1887 provided lump sums for the continued operation of these land-grant colleges and specified that only one-fifth of the first federal appropriation could be used for construction and only 5 percent thereafter: the remainder had to be spent on operation and maintenance – including teachers' salaries.

Ghost in the House?

Readers of William Costello's series on Vice President Nixon in this journal will recall how helpful Murray Chotiner was in Nixon's climb to power. He was the architect of the 1950 campaign strategy which defeated Helen Gahagan Douglas. As campaign manager in 1952 when Nixon ran for Vice-President with Eisenhower, he bargained hard with the General's advisers in the tense days during the "Checkers" crisis.

It will also be recalled that Nixon looked the other way when Chotiner was under Congressional scrutiny in 1956 for allegedly using his contacts at the White House to fix cases pending before the Civil Aeronautics Authority. "Questionable though Chotiner's dealings may have been," wrote Costello, "there were some who shook their heads doubtfully at the haste with which Nixon dropped an old and trusted associate."

Chotiner has reportedly never forgiven the Vice President; and he is said to have resented bitterly the speed with which smaller political potatoes in the southern California GOP joined Nixon in cold-shouldering him. This at least is the generally accepted explanation in Los Angeles political circles of Chotiner's announcement that he will enter the June 7 Congressional primary in the Sixteenth District. The candidate of the Republican organization to succeed retiring incumbent Donald Jackson is Alfonzo Bell, Jr., who is turning over his seat as county Republican chairman to Congressman Patrick Hillings. (Hillings heads up the Nixon forces in southern California.) Although Nixon has not said a word publicly – Chotiner says he spoke with the Vice President and had "not been discouraged" – it is assumed in Los Angeles that he is backing Bell.

Chotiner, true to the principles of political expediency in which he once coached the Vice President, will be running down two sides of the street simultaneously. He is appealing to the many Jewish voters in the district (who are not normally right-wing) as well as to pro-nationalist sentiment within his party. To the latter, he speaks of his opposition to the Humphrey-sponsored (and Nixon-supported) effort in the Senate to repeal the Connally Amendment restricting World Court jurisdiction over the US. He is given almost no chance to beat Bell; but what a chance to embarrass old "friends"!

On Wisconsin

For those voters in the 50 states who believe that the way to choose a President of this powerful nation at this critical moment is to send candidates into marathon state primary fights, the following routine announcement released last week of a three-day schedule in Wisconsin of Sen. John F. Kennedy may be of interest:

Tuesday, February 16

5.00 a.m.	Madison Airport; join car caravan
5:30 a.m.	Oscar Mayer Packing Plant
9:00 a.m.	Press Club Press Conference
10:45 a.m.	Fort Atkinson for street tour
1:00 p.m.	Whitewater College Auditorium for convocation
2:30 p.m.	Elkhorn for street tour
3:15 p.m.	Lake Geneva for street tour
5:00 p.m.	Kenosha for tour of downtown area
7:30 p.m.	Reception for Senator & Mrs. Kennedy American Legion Hall

Wednesday, February 17

7:45 a.m.	Labor Leaders Breakfast, Milwaukee
10:15 a.m.	Fort Washington for street tour
11:30 a.m.	West Bender for street tour
1:15 p.m.	Mayville City Hall
2:10 p.m.	Beaver Dam – Reception, Hotel Rogers
4:20 p.m.	Waupun for street tour
5:30 p.m.	Fond du Lac for street tour
8:00 p.m.	Reception for Senator & Mrs. Kennedy

Thursday, February 18

6:20 a.m.	Plant gate Wisconsin Axle Co. (Oshkosh)
7:15 a.m.	Plant gate Oshkosh Overalls Co.

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9:30 a.m.	Oshkosh State College – Convocation and Coffee Hour
11:30 a.m.	Appleton – tour business district
1:00 p.m.	Convocation, St. Norbert's College, De Pere
2:30 p.m.	Downtown Greenbay – tour Champion Paper Mills
3:45 p.m.	WJPG – Radio Press Panel Interview
5:00 p.m.	Northland Hotel – Press Conference
8:00 p.m.	Reception for Senator & Mrs. Kennedy
10:00 p.m.	Leave for Airport

To which it may be added that neither Franklin D. Roosevelt nor Harry S. Truman ever personally campaigned in any state primary anywhere any year they were running for the Presidency.

LOUIS H. BEAN ON ELECTION PROSPECTS – IV

The Number Who Go to the Polls

For a great many years it was generally believed that a large vote helps the Democratic candidates, and a small one the Republicans. This was true during the years from 1930 to 1950. But it did not apply during the 1920's and 1950's when Republicans were the beneficiaries of a large turnout. The correct generalization is: A large vote helps; a small vote hurts *the party in power.*

Normally this "law," having worked for the Democrats in mid-term 1958, should work for the Republicans in 1960, but as with every other election factor its effect can be more than offset by one or more other important election feature, such as the relative popularity of the candidates or the power of domestic or international issues to galvanize the electorate.

The surprising result of the first wartime election, that of 1942, sharpened our awareness of the importance of turnout. Following the 1942 elections when the Democrats lost control of both House and Senate, Republican publicity attempted to create the expectation that the GOP would capture the White House in 1944. Examining the statistical bases for that claim I found that practically all Republican net gains in 1942 were associated with general voter apathy. The stay-away vote was much greater among Democrats than among Republicans. Millions of voters were preoccupied with war activity at home and in the services at home and abroad, with the result that the 1942 turnout was extremely low. This fact alone, properly appraised, became the basis for Democratic campaigning in 1944 with the expectation that a larger turnout would redound to the benefit of the incumbent Democratic candidate, as it did.

Much the same statistical situation existed before the 1948 Truman election. The 1946 turnout was also abnormally light, and it cost the Democrats control of both houses of Congress. But the very fact that the 1946 vote was so small implied greater interest in the Presidential year and therefore a larger vote in 1948. Coupled with other reasons, that fact helped provide the fairly clear basis for expecting that the Democrats would regain control of Congress in 1948.

It is not, however, sufficient to know that there is always a greater turnout in Presidential election years than in Congressional years. We need to know whether the total vote for the Presidential candidates is relatively large or small. In the Truman victory in 1948, for example, the total vote was actually below normal for Presidential years. As I have analyzed it in *The Mid-Term Battle,* there were about 10 million voters who abstained, more Democrats than Republicans, thus cutting down the size of Truman's margin. My estimate is that there were that many voters who weren't excited by either Truman or Dewey, and couldn't see themselves going for Wallace, the Progressive candidate, or Thurmond, the Dixiecrat.

How does one know whether a Presidential year turnout is large or small? The simplest clue is in the fact that with a growing population, which has been adding about five million voters every four years, there should be about 4 to 5 million more voters in a current turnout than in the preceding Presidential election. This simple test shows you at a glance that the Truman-Dewey-Wallace-Thurmond election in 1948 brought out only 49 million voters, compared with 48 million in 1944, and that the 1944 vote was two million below the 50 million vote of 1940, the previous high mark.

The growth of population between 1920 and 1940, and increasing participation in elections, should have produced a turnout of about 59 million in 1948, or 10 million more than actually showed up at the polls.

Similarly the 1952 election, according to my projec-

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tion of this historical trend, called for about 63.5 million votes in 1952 and about 68 million in 1956. The actual vote in the Eisenhower-Stevenson elections came to 61.5 million in 1952 and to only 62 million in 1956.

These over-all facts throw some light on the common notion that Eisenhower's great popularity in 1952 and 1956 brought out an unusually large vote. They indicate that the 1952 election campaign brought out no more than a normal vote and possibly as much as two million votes short of normal as suggested by the chart. In 1956 something served to keep the total vote down to no more than the number that had taken part in 1952, indicating that about 5 million voters remained apathetic to the second Eisenhower-Stevenson campaign. It would not be surprising to find that many voters in 1956 felt disappointed, following the great promises of 1952. One outstanding example is to be found in the Farm Belt where Eisenhower in 1956 did not receive the support he had in 1952. Campaign promises to obtain parity prices for farmers in the market-place were made to sound as if farmers would get better price support treatment than they had had in the Roosevelt and Truman days, but shortly after inauguration farmers discovered that the real purpose of the new Administration was to move persistently to lower farm price supports and ultimately to do away with them entirely. Midwest resentment showed up even more vigorously in the 1958 election than in 1956, and helped lift the Democratic tide (as shown by public opinion polls) close to its Roosevelt high point in 1959.

The following table of votes cast since 1928 and the accompanying chart showing the same record graphically should help clarify the facts about normal and abnormal voter participation.

TOTAL VOTES CAST IN MID-TERM AND PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION YEARS



Turnout in Mid-Term and Presidential Elections
(Millions)

Votes for Congressmen		*Votes for President*		*Increase*
1926	20.6	1928	34.2	13.6
1930	24.8	1932	39.8	15.0
1934	32.5	1936	45.6	13.1
1938	36.2	1940	49.8	13.6
1942	28.1	1944	48.0	19.9
1946	34.4	1948	48.8	14.4
1950	40.4	1952	61.5	21.1
1954	42.6	1956	62.0	19.4
1958	45.7	1960	?	

This is only part of the whole statistical story of voting participation. Beneath the national totals there are some interesting regional differences which call for qualifying the two generalizations I have emphasized here, namely that the size of the vote is greater in Presidential elections than in mid-term Congressional elections, and that the party in power normally benefits from normal participation. In certain states where one party dominates, just the opposite may be the case. In predominantly Democratic territory, as in the South, a larger vote in Presidential years during the 1930's and 1940's often meant a smaller Democratic share, probably because some of the relatively few Republicans tend to stay away knowing their votes carry so little weight. The same may be true for some of the predominantly Republican areas of the Northeast. Our concern here, however, is with the national character of the 1960 election and whether apathetic or exciting campaigning and participation will help elect Nixon or his opponent.

Given relatively normal conditions, 70 million voters, more or less, could be expected to participate this year, but it is not statistically possible to forecast 8-9 months ahead how many votes will be cast, for we do not know what will be the magnitude and results of this year's efforts to get out the vote. There will be much door-bell and telephone ringing. Many business, labor and other group activities will be launched to get out a large vote, but a below normal turnout is not unlikely this year. The fact of many Democratic Presidential candidates could lead to post-convention factional disappointments and cause some Democrats to stay away from the polls. On the other hand some voters who turned out for popular Eisenhower chiefly in appreciation of his military record may this year decide to stay away with Nixon's popularity as yet below that of Eisenhower's. Bearing in mind our earlier generalization (a small vote *hurts* the party in power), one might guess, and only guess, that the likelihood of a below normal vote would cost the Republicans several points.

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Living on Left-overs

In Baltimore some 10 days ago the non-candidacy of the not-running Mr. Adlai Stevenson moved into high gear when a local group of the Americans for Democratic Action was addressed by the team of Rauh & Wechsler (Joseph L. and James A.) on the subject of the impending campaign. More in sorrow than in anger they pleaded with those nostalgic liberals who are still sadly for Adlai to snap out of it and back somebody who can win. Unhappily, they did not agree on the identity of this character. Mr. Rauh leaned to Kennedy, but Mr. Wechsler was dubious; all they did agree on was that the election of either Symington or Johnson is hardly to be expected, if Nixon is the Republican candidate, and would be hardly worth while if it were certain. Humphrey? Well, yes, but . . .

So while it is definite that the Stevenson non-candidacy was thrown into high gear there is some feeling in Baltimore that the wheels spun, and it made little headway. The trouble is that the visiting firemen gave no conclusive answer to the old, nagging question: If not Adlai, why Jack? Or Stu? Or Hubert? Or Lyndon? If there is no apparent reason to suppose that any Democrat can win, why not be licked with Adlai, as usual?

The *Baltimore Sun*, an Ike-idolater but never a fervent admirer of Nixon, was moved the other day to the sardonic observation that both parties seem obsessed by a will to lose, in that neither is disposed to put up a man who can really stir the enthusiasm of the country. To a superficial observer this seems obviously true; but it doesn't answer the question, where is the man?

Kennedy is a Catholic, which would arouse some enthusiasm, but of a dubious kind. What else is he? His friends assert that, except on the issue of McCarthyism, he has a good voting record, but what did he vote for except such vestigial remainders of the New Deal and the Fair Deal as the Dixiecrat confederacy chose to allow to come before the Senate? For that matter, what have the others done that is any better?

If Democracy, like yond Cassius, hath a lean and hungry look it is because for nearly eight years it has been living on left-overs, when it ate at all. So has the GOP for that matter. The last genuinely original idea that has been injected into American politics was the Brannan Plan, 10 years ago, but the only political leader who has made anything of that is – of all people! –Ezra Taft Benson, and he is for it only as regards wool.

So it would seem that the way to promote the non-candidacy of Mr. Stevenson in such a way that it will be certain to keep him out of public life is simple and obvious. It is merely to offer an alternative. Mr. Rauh and Mr. Wechsler are wrong in assuming that what binds the Stevensonians is merely the enchantment of an attractive personality. It is the fact that to date they have seen nowhere else to go.

If their requirement were a candidate who talks more and says less than the first citizen of Libertyville, they would have no problem. They would turn to Nixon, in that respect unquestionably runner-up to Ike, the champion. But what they need is the reverse, a man who talks less and says more. They have not uncovered him.

For instance, Stevenson remarked only last month that we can balance the budget at any time by raising taxes. That remark may have been terrible politics but there is more sense in it than there is in some Congressional debates that have raged for days. There are, moreover, some heretics who doubt that it was bad politics. The typical American voter is no mental giant, but he understands perfectly that when you are helpless to keep your expenses from going up, you must increase your income or be in trouble; and when someone tells him that it applies to the United States Government as well as to an individual, he is neither scandalized nor enraged; and he will be bored only if everyone else is telling him the same thing. When everyone else is telling him something different a statement of the obvious will strike him with great force.

In theory, no doubt, Mr. Stevenson could promote his own non-candidacy in either of two ways – by quoting Sherman to the effect that if nominated he will not run, and if elected he will not serve; or by throwing all his influence in favor of one of the other candidates. But for a man who has twice been honored by the party to quote Sherman would make him a heel; and for the titular leader of the party to throw his influence to one candidate – which is to say, against all the others – would make him a dictator. Being neither heel nor dictator, Mr. Stevenson is stopped both ways.

And, as Mr. Dooley was wont to remark, there y'are. As things stand, great numbers of melancholy liberals will continue to see in Adlai their last, best hope.

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Some Hard Decisions

Chester Bowles and Thomas K. Finletter on 1960

WHAT CAN WE DO IN ASIA?

Between now and July the focus of all Democrats will be on that still nameless man who will be their Presidential nominee. Between July and November, their energies will be given to electing him. Although the probable Republican nominee is not so nameless, we can expect a similar Republican concentration on the immediate problems of this election year.

History, however, cannot be made to stand still. The forces which shape our destiny move relentlessly on, oblivious to political debates, nominating conventions and public opinion polls. What will historians say from the perspective of a generation or so hence about the influence of the United States over the course of events in the mid-20th Century?

I believe they will agree that we Americans faced at least five decisions in the first 60 years of our century, each of which had a profound effect not only on our lives but on the course of world history. In the first two of these decisions, our response was disastrously wrong; in the second two, it was brilliantly right; and the fifth still hangs in the balance. I shall list them briefly:

First, was our tragic failure in 1919 to join the League of Nations and to throw our power and prestige behind a program to preserve the newly-won peace.

Second, was our equally costly failure to understand the revolutionary upheaval in China and its relevance to our future security, following the collapse of the Manchu Empire in 1911.

Third, was our success in meeting the Nazi threat to Western Europe.

Fourth, was our brilliant and decisive response to the challenge posed by the economic and political chaos in Europe following World War II.

Fifth, and finally, we now face a deepening crisis in India's economic and political development which may determine, for good or ill, not only the course of events in Asia and Africa, but the future relationship of the whole underdeveloped world to the Atlantic powers, on the one hand, and the Soviet Union and Communist China, on the other. This challenge is now only gradually coming to be understood. But unless we muster the determination and the means to cope with it, the price of failure may be more costly than our failure to understand the challenge posed by the upheaval in China.

In the 19th Century and the first decades of the 20th, world peace could be said to rest almost exclusively on the balance of power in Europe. Since the end of World War II, this has been fundamentally changed. Hundreds of millions of Asians and Africans who once responded to orders from London, Paris and The Hague have become free from colonial control. Inevitably the emergence of these new and underdeveloped nations has given American foreign policy new and far broader dimensions.

The situation has been further compounded by the fact that this revolutionary development has occurred at precisely the time when our modern technology is widening the already highly explosive gap between the rich white minority, most of whom live around the North Atlantic basin, and the poor colored majority, who live largely in the Southern hemispheres.

Meantime, moving toward the forefront in world affairs, is the new Chinese giant, intent on overnight industrialization, with 650 million dynamic people, a doctrinaire, aggressive leadership, inadequate resources, and a tempting military vacuum rich in much that China needs, just beyond her Southeastern borders.

Finally, there is the Soviet Union, with a steel capacity of 60 million tons, an annual rate of industrial growth nearly three times our own, graduating twice as many engineers and scientists, and with enormous military power. Since her early clumsy efforts in China, the Soviet Union has understood the decisive importance of the underdeveloped areas. In recent years her leaders have developed a new flexibility, new subtlety, and new economic and political skill in dealing with them.

Against this complex background the decisive significance of India comes into clear perspective. Her population is equal to that of Africa and Latin America combined, her resources are substantial, her geographic position strategic, her government democratic and fiercely independent, her future highly uncertain.

The physical and strategic importance of India is further underscored by her immense *political* importance. Hundreds of millions of Asians and Africans are coming to see that the only practical political and economic alternative to the ruthlessly totalitarian program of Communist China is the pragmatic approach as exemplified by democratic India.

If India with all her advantages of able leadership, a competent civil service, trained technicians, substantial resources, and the great tradition of Gandhi, fails in her attempt to bring widening economic opportunities to her

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people through democratic means, how could less well endowed new nations hope to succeed? And if they in their frustration throw in their lot with Communist totalitarianism, what will then happen to the global balance of power?

But let us also consider the impact on these same nations if India *succeeds:* if India achieves a satisfactory measure of economic growth and of political stability, if the billion or more people in Asia, Africa and Latin America see that the people of India have been assured individual freedom, increasing justice, and a sense of personal belonging, as well as more food, clothing, schools, hospitals and houses – then the cause of orderly growth in the decisive underdeveloped areas through non-Communist means will have won a crucial victory and the outlook for a rational and peaceful world will be greatly improved.

New Realities of World Power

The challenge to American policymakers growing out of this unprecedented combination of forces began to be apparent in the early 1950's. Several of us who were directly exposed to these forces at that time stressed the need for an entirely new American response to what we believed to be the new realities of world power in Asia and Africa.

But in diplomacy, as in other forms of human endeavor, old habits of mind often persist long after their relevance has passed. While the Soviet Union has been learning new tactics and developing new sources of power, the United States has clung on to old responses and old concepts.

Indeed, until recently India's significance has been obscured by official irritation over Indian "neutralism," confusion over India's economic prospects, and lack of understanding of the profound consequences of the Asian and African revolution in which India stands as the central force.

In April, 1956, India finished a successful First Five Year Plan. Her Second Five Year Plan scheduled for completion in April, 1961, will fall somewhat short of its relatively modest objectives. The bolder Third Five Year Plan which follows may be politically, as well as economically, decisive – not simply to India but to the long arc of non-Communist, but uncertain, new nations which stretch from Korea to Ghana.

Since 1951 the United States has provided India with considerable capital, many technicians, and large quantities of wheat. But if India is to fulfill her minimum political and economic objectives, this program must now be sharply increased. Our aid must be long term and adequate. It must be given wisely, sensitively, and without political strings. It must be provided not as a substitute for other badly-needed grants and loans to smaller nations, but as an additional effort in behalf of nations whose strategic importance is paramount to the future of two whole continents.

Now let us look the situation squarely in the face: No one can be sure that an adequate, well-administered American aid program will *assure* India's success. Nor can we predict that without such aid India and the other new nations will certainly collapse and that Communism will become the major force in the underdeveloped continents. Yet our present capacity to tip the scales on the side of freedom is very substantial indeed. Thus the fifth great foreign policy decision of our century comes into focus. Are American leaders prepared to call once again on the American people for forthright, understanding, creative political and economic action on a question of profound importance to their future?

To an undetermined extent the President's recent trip to Asia appears to have opened the Administration's mind to the opportunity and the challenge. Yet now as in the case of the four other critical decisions, timid men in high places are counseling postponement and inaction. They are saying now, as they said of the Marshall Plan, "A major effort in Asia and Africa is a political impossibility in an election year."

"How can we act effectively under a divided government with the President of one party and the Congress of the other?"

"The American people simply do not understand the needs – and they are tired of crises anyway."

"America cannot afford the money, and even if we could, it would be inflationary."

"Congress will never agree to the necessary long-range planning."

Now these are the self-same defeatist arguments which in 1947 and 1948 were thrown at the Truman Administration and its bipartisan supporters in Congress, when they proposed to rebuild and defend Europe. But to their everlasting honor and glory, these men set aside political advantage to reject these arguments out of hand. They took their case to the American people, told them what was needed, and won their overwhelming support.

Today our total national output of goods and services is double what it was in those days. There are idle men and idle resources ready to be put to work. The inflationary consequences are immeasurably less. And the total additional cost of a truly adequate economic effort in all of Asia, Africa and Latin America is only *half* the cost of the Marshall Plan.

In 1947 and 1948 our leaders acted with insight and courage. As a result new life was breathed into Europe, new political and economic foundations were created on the ruins of the old, and 400 million war-weary people were set on the high road to prosperity, freedom and peace.

In 1960 are we prepared to act in behalf of freedom not only in crucially important India but other parts of

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Asia, Africa, and Latin America as we did in behalf of Europe in 1947? Are we ready to recruit the necessary able men and women – regardless of party – as we did in the days of the Marshall Plan? Are we ready to bypass the custodians of the past who seek our aid largely to bolster their own privileged positions and to work with the democratic builders of the future?

I believe the American people are ready to be told the requirements. And once informed of what needs to be done, I believe they will offer their support as they offered it in the years following the war, and that we will then proceed to add one more brilliant chapter to the history of democratic government in America.

I do not say that our failure to act will set the Red Army marching through the streets of Washington or even New Delhi. What do I say – and I say it with profound conviction – is that half-way measures may cause us to lose democracy's last opportunity to influence the course of events in Asia, and ultimately in Africa and Latin America as well. In this century we have thrown away two similar opportunities to help produce a more secure world. On two equally decisive occasions we acted wisely, boldly and well. The fifth great foreign policy decision of our century is now at the top of our national agenda.

Chester Bowles

HOW SECURE IS THIS COUNTRY?

For some disastrous reason we are being told by our government that so far as armaments, and peace, are concerned all is well in every way. Now when our deterrent power is at its lowest point since 1943, when we are behind the Russians in the race for space and the weapons of the future, we are being given the most optimistic reports ever of our military position. Mr. Mahon, Chairman of the House Appropriations Subcommittee with jurisdiction in these matters, has said that the Department of Defense presentation just made to him was the most enthusiastic and rosy he had ever heard.

It doesn't make much difference if the Russians get ahead of us a bit in the weapons of the future because it's certain they won't attack us. We have and are sure always to have an atomic stalemate, a balance of terror, which guarantees us that these dreadful weapons will never be used. So, we can spend our wealth on consumer goods while the Russians spend theirs on armaments, natural resources, science, the arts and education. And since peace is guaranteed we don't have to bother about disarmament.

Quite the contrary. It is not true that war – the big war – is now impossible. It is not true that because we have such dreadful weapons some miracle has changed man's soul so that he will never, not even accidentally, make war. It is reckless and evil to base a nation's foreign policy on any such idea. Men who know what they are talking about have pointed out that the danger of accidental war has never been greater than now – and that it is going to become more likely as atomic weapons and missiles and the even worse weapons of the future get into the hands of the Communist Chinese and the rest of the world. The possibility of a limited war growing into the big blowup, the innumerable possibilities of miscalculation or blunder in the forthcoming era of rocket and satellite warfare, or the deliberate act of a fanatic or an idiot, all add up to an alarming danger of an accidental big war.

These modern weapons are simply too hot to handle and as time goes on the curve of probability that they will go off will steadily rise.

The experts know also that even the possibility of deliberate war cannot be excluded. In this fast-moving day of breakthrough in the development and invention of new weapons there is always the possibility that a country which is willing to strike first, such as Russia, may achieve a phase of such superiority that it will dominate, and be able to destroy with relative safety to itself, a country like the United States which, quite rightly and irrevocably, is committed to striking only second. The idea that the miracle has happened, and that presto! war has been forever banished, is dangerous nonsense.

For the immediate years to come I doubt if the danger of deliberate war is as serious as that of accidental war, but I do know one thing without doubt, and that is that to base a national policy on the assumption that war with modern weapons, whether accidental or deliberate, cannot possibly happen is a reckless breach of responsibility to the people of the United States.

The worst result of this euphoria about the atomic stalemate is not that it makes us neglect our defenses. The worst is that it makes us stop trying to find ways to make war less likely. I don't mean it is good to neglect our defenses. No matter how optimistic anybody may be about the Russians or the Chinese never making the big war – and I am not at all that optimistic – it is intolerable to let the United States get into the position of being a second-rate military power.

The Beginnings of World Order

But it is even worse not to recognize that the new weapons of mass destruction are a new and horrible menace, and that for our own and our children's safety we have to bring them under control. War in the past, as barbarous as it was, had a kind of social use in that it was a way, however primitive and cruel, of settling disputes between nations without completely destroying the contending parties or the world in which they lived. Now we can no longer depend on having this way of settling disputes between nations at a bearable cost;

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but the disputes are still there, as violent as ever. So some way has to be found to settle them without war; something has to be found which will take the place of war and do what war used to do; and war itself – all war preferably, but the big nuclear war certainly – must be universally prohibited.

So far our answer to this dilemma has been to deceive ourselves. Not being able to face the truth and apparently not having the character to grapple with the problem, we pretend that the atomic stalemate has made war disappear from the universe. This way lies disaster. What is needed is to build – or at least make a genuine effort to build – the beginnings of a new world order to keep the peace. It can be only the beginnings because that is the way order and government grow. We can't make one great jump into a full world government, but we can take the immediately necessary steps to defend ourselves against the immediate menace.

For these beginnings of law and order, for this new King's Peace, the obvious first step is for a world agreement for the disarmament of nuclear weapons, to be inspected and enforced by the United Nations under a system which will deny to states the arms which would give them the power to violate the agreement.

There was a time when this sounded like a radical idea. Now, though, the principle of complete, inspected and enforced disarmament has become orthodox. Mr. Selwyn Lloyd proposed exactly that in the United Nations last September. Mr. Khrushchev repeated it the day after. And believe it or not opinion is growing that both the British and Russian Governments mean it.

Even the United States, after a long phase of rejecting all serious efforts toward disarmament, has accepted this idea of comprehensive, inspected and enforced disarmament. President Eisenhower in his latest State of the Union Message said that no fact of today's world was as important as that mankind now approaches the state where mutual annihilation becomes a possibility; and time and again the President has said that there is no subject more important than that of disarmament. And only a few months ago the United States signed, along with the other 81 members of the United Nations, a resolution which committed our country to the proposition "that the question of general and complete disarmament is the most important one facing the world today" and that the United States and the other 81 members of the United Nations "hope that measures leading toward the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control will be worked out in detail and agreed upon in the shortest possible time." So all we have to do now is for the 82 nations to get busy with "the most important question before the world today" and work out these measures which are so important, "in the shortest possible time."

It may be we will do this – if we have the proper kind of leadership. But before we become too sure about it, we might reflect on the fact that there have rarely been periods in our history when the gap between the announced purposes of government and the taking of measures to carry them out has been so great. Here is where the liberals come in. Here is their opportunity to offer the country ideas and programs which meet the needs of the 1960's, not only on disarmament and peace but on other matters too.

Role of the Liberals

I believe what the country needs is a new liberalism, a 1960 Deal – not only an improved New Deal of the 1930's. The Roosevelt Administration's great liberal measures as continued and developed at home and abroad by the Truman Administration are among the greatest achievements of our country – and there is no better proof of this than the fact that no Administration could repeal the New Deal, the country would not stand for it. But if that's all the liberals have to offer, the people will not be pleased with them. We all – and the liberals especially – owe it to the country to bring forth ideas and programs to meet and conquer the monstrous challenge of the 1960's – along two broad lines.

First, we must repudiate and reverse the Administration's policy of luxury in consumer goods at the cost of the public sector. We must have what Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., has called qualitative liberalism. We must not let the Communists beat us in education, which builds the quality of future generations; or in science and the development of our cities and our natural resources, without which we will become a second-rate state; or in armaments without which our country will be defenseless in a jungle world.

And second, the United States must convert this shaky peace by mutual terror, this non-existent atomic stalemate into a more stable and safer world order – a world order centered around world disarmament.

Where can we get the leadership for policies like these? Only, I am convinced, from the liberals. And the responsibility is peculiarly on the liberals of the Democratic Party. Parties in this country are coalitions, and include many shades of attitude on the great issues of the day. But the Democratic Party since 1933 has had a strong liberal content which fits it especially, I believe, to lead in getting solutions of the kind I have mentioned.

I am sure the country can count on the Democrats for a new emphasis on the public sector of the economy. The test is whether the Democrats will put the same power and urgency behind the drive for peace by way of disarmament. It is up to the liberals of the party to see to it that they do. The liberals must get into this – to them – unaccustomed business of armaments and disarmament and give to it the spirit of innovation, the daring, and the imagination which it needs.

THOMAS K. FINLETTER

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Their Tribes and Ours

by David Riesman

The essays assembled in this book reveal the distilled thought of a philosophical and profoundly humanistic anthropologist as she seeks to grapple with ways of experiencing life that are radically different from prevalent American ones. In the papers on the Wintu Indians, for instance, she describes, through the medium of Wintu language, an attitude towards the self, the other, and the cosmos that strike us as mystical: indeed, Wintu forms of

Freedom and Culture
by Dorothy Lee
(Prentice-Hall; $1.95)

speech imply the participation of the individual (our term, not theirs) in his family, his society, the animals that he hunts (and that do or do not choose to die for him), and the rest of nature. By speaking of "his" family, "his" society, we already imply a possessiveness, an egocentricity, that is absent in Wintu. As Dorothy Lee writes:

> "We are aggressive toward reality. We say, This is bread; we do not say like the Wintu, *I call this bread*, or I *feel* or *taste* or *see it to be bread*. The Wintu never says starkly *This is*; if he speaks of reality which is not within his own restricting experience, he does not affirm it, he only implies it. . . . Our attitude toward nature is colored by a desire to control and exploit. The Wintu relationship with nature is one of intimacy and mutual courtesy."

Dorothy Lee did field work among the Wintu, but she has applied the same mode of close linguistic analysis to cultures where her field work is vicarious, based on the work of others; in either procedure, she has the art of empathy, feeling herself into the very soul of "her" tribe, looking out on the world with its perceptions – and looking also at ourselves with its way of looking.

Anthropological relativism – the principle that each way of life has its own values and must be judged in its own terms – is no longer a new or even an untarnished idea. But it is one thing to realize that such-and-such a tribe has different sexual customs, or eats ants, and another to confront the possibility that, where we "see" a circle of houses, the Trobrianders "see" a series of unconnected dots, or that the Tikopia do not make our distinctions between past, present, and future. Dorothy Lee is able to enter into these different ways of seeing the world through her great sensitivity to the structure and nuances of language; she looks at cultures, in other words, from within. The strain put on the imagination by *Freedom and Culture* is akin to that posed by the concept of wavicles, or by science fiction.

The challenge is not only to the intellectual but also to the moral imagination. Dorothy Lee uses "primitive" cultures, as some of the earlier social critics did, as a basis for raising questions about our own socially structured ways of seeing, feeling, and believing. She regards Americans as people who can only relate to an object in terms of a linear or comparative evaluation of it: it is better than something else, good for something else, like something else – one source, she suggests, of our frequent embarrassment when confronting a friend's baby: what are we to make of it? Analyzing American linguistic usage in the same fashion as Wintu, she wonders about the sorts of constraint latent in our use of "got to," as in "I've got to go now," or "I've got to get some eggs"; and (in a paper not included in this collection) she puzzles what it means that we use "up" so often, as in "jump up," "I came up on him," and so on. The assertiveness, egocentricity, jumpiness, and individualism that emerge as American (or more broadly Western) traits from this analysis invite Mrs. Lee's empathy but not her sympathy. She values an outlook that is at once more respectful of the autonomous thereness of objects (including people) and more binding of individuals into a common set of meanings. She admires the Navaho because, as she describes them (following Clyde Kluckhohn), they never force a child, decide for him, or speak for him; yet the children, wanting to become right and proper Navaho, learn to cooperate out of joy, not fear. Contrastingly, she is outraged when her children's elementary schools, in order to teach cooperation, compel her artistic youngsters to make animals for a classroom frieze that look like the cheery animals the teacher wants: this is interference with dignity without even the benefit of shared meanings.

In "The Joy of Work as Participation," Mrs. Lee brings her feelings even closer to home. She describes her conflict as a career-woman-cum-mother-and-wife, sewing up a doll blanket for her three-year-old daughter on Christmas Eve, resentful at the time lost from her profession because she could not afford to buy a blanket. She is tired, as such women are generally tired. Then, suddenly, as if by inspiration she has a change of heart:

> ". . . I was aware of a deep enjoyment in what I was doing. It was a feeling that had nothing to do with the pleasure the work would give my daughter on the morrow; it had nothing to do with a sense of achievement, or of virtue in duty accomplished. And I knew that I had never liked to embroider. . . . I knew that I was experiencing what it meant to be a social being, not merely Dorothy Lee, an individual; I knew that I had truly become a mother, a wife, a neighbor, a teacher. I knew that some boundary had disappeared, so that I was working in a social medium; that I was not working for the future pleasure of a distant daughter, but rather within a relationship unaffected by temporality or physical absence. What gave meaning to my work was the medium in which I was

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working – the medium of love, in a broad sense."

And in turn this discovery gave her a fuller sense of the Tikopia, who exist in a "universal interrelatedness," and whose style of thought she had to retranslate from the descriptions of the excellent ethnographer, Raymond Firth, since of course his account of them was colored by his Englishness.

Mrs. Lee herself is Greek; she came to the United States in adolescence; she includes in this volume a paper, "View of the Self in Greek Culture," that struck me as astonishingly sympathetic to a quite masterful Greek individualism and pride that is deeply related to the immediate family, but not at all to the surrounding universe of people and things. It is the authenticity, dignity, and courage of the Greeks that appeal to her, even though they appear to lack the mystical oneness with nature she also feels drawn to in the Wintu and the Tikopia. It is the factiousness, shrillness, and pretense in much of American life that repel her.

It should be clear that Dorothy Lee is not the sort of anthropologist who hides, or believes she hides, her own values, her own preferred styles and qualities of life. But her explicitness doesn't make it easier for me either to be sure that, despite my Americanness, I know what she espouses or how I feel about it – this, though I have followed her work for years and read and reread this volume with intensity. Plainly, she is critical of the rationalizing, compartmentalizing intellect – as are many existentialists, students of Zen, mystics, and artists. I find no problem here, especially since Mrs. Lee does not revel in irrationality *per se*.

Likewise, Dorothy Lee stresses the difference between the sense of personal worth and dignity possessed by many members of traditional cultures, and the irrascible individualism which for many Americans is the cowboy mark of true independence. Here, too, I share Mrs. Lee's values. But I begin to have doubts when I consider the social embodiment of the personal qualities we both admire. For her picture of the Wintu or the Trobriand Islanders intrigues but does not invite me: the world they inhabit is in her account richly peopled by tribal fantasy, but I suspect that the metaphors that unfold in her translation are frozen in common speech and that the life of the tribes – now in any case lost through white contact and disruption – was not utopian but thin, liveable only in the absence of alternatives. That is, I can admire the *tribal* product, the way of life, and even the dignity and moral carriage of individuals, but the texture of individual life seems insufficiently dense and complex to me; it lacks dialectic.

Conversely, the texture of individual American life today seems to me, in its best reaches, generous, various, moody, vivid, intimate, ironic, and sparky. The "tribal" properties now on display in this country, however, are often also, as Dorothy Lee's work helps us more fully to realize, exploitative, ethnocentric, alienated, frenetic without gaiety. And, while I can begin to imagine what a large society would look like where individual quality would be less at variance with social result – a society more cooperative, less solipsistic than ours, less programmed and narrowly pragmatic – I do not feel that even the most amiable preliterate societies provide us with creative paths of life. Their fragility in the face of the Western models is not due merely to the overwhelming physical power of the latter, but also to their own relative poverty; tribes such as the Hopi that have proved more resistant, pay for a surface cooperativeness with much hidden suspicion, resentment, and fear of one's neighbor. If the social product consists both of the quality of individual lives and of the power of those lives to reproduce their kind and kindliness, then neither the tribes who come to life in *Freedom and Culture* nor our own society have made much headway. So I end up feeling that Mrs. Lee, despite the scrupulousness with which she endows every detail in this book, has tipped the scales in favor of her tribes and against our own.

Paul Blanshard Returns to his Subject

by William Clancy

More than a hundred years ago, the French historian Chateaubriand, surveying the role of the Catholic Church in the modern world, observed:

> "A pope who would enter into the spirit of the century and who would place himself at the head of enlightened generations could rejuvenate the papacy. But these ideas can never penetrate the old men in the Sacred College . . . Seated on the two-fold ruins of Rome, the popes give the impression of being tremendously aware of the power of death."

In 1864 the reigning pontiff, Pius IX, seemed to offer a breathtaking confirmation of Chateaubriand's sad conclusion. In his *Syllabus of Errors*, Pius catalogued and condemned what he considered the most dangerous errors of the age. Among the condemned "errors" was one which held "that the Roman Pontiff can and ought to reconcile himself to, and agree with, progress, liberalism and modern civilization."

God and Man in Washington
by Paul Blanshard
(Beacon Press; $3.50)

The *Syllabus* delighted the anti-clericals of 19th Century Europe, who had not dared hope that the pope himself would provide their best ammunition against the Church. And it caused bitter dismay among many Catholics – especially in France – who had worked for some *rapprochement* between the Church and the modern world. These Catholics, led by the brilliant Bishop of Orleans, Duponloup, immediately began to explain the document away, pointing out that what Pius had condemned was only a certain doctrinaire, anti-religious "progress, liberalism and civilization."

The efforts of these men were philosophically adroit and, probably, historically sound, but the unfortunate *Syllabus* could not be buried so easily. In the 96 years since Pio Nono spoke to an amazed generation, innumerable Catholics have given a dedicated service to "the modern world"; they have joined in the fight for many of liberalism's most cherished causes and have developed a theory of religious freedom which is compatible both with Catholic

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doctrine and democratic practice. But the spirit of the *Syllabus* continues to haunt their encounter with the "liberal" world because, though Catholics might wish to exorcise it, their critics insist that it be conjured up. *They* are convinced that Pius IX meant exactly what he said – forever.

None of Catholicism's American critics is more convinced of this – or more diligent in proclaiming his conviction – than Paul Blanshard. For over a decade now Mr. Blanshard has played the role of a latter-day Paul Revere, riding about on his "liberal" charger to warn complacent Americans that the hierarchy is coming. In books, articles, letters-to-editors and lectures, he has played upon one theme: that between the aspirations of a democratic society and the pretensions of the Catholic Church there exists a deep, irreconcilable enmity and that the price of preserving "American freedom" is eternal vigilance against "Catholic power."

Mr. Blanshard does not, of course, consider himself an anti-Catholic; in fact, he feels an admirable scorn for the older, cruder anti-Catholic myths that are nurtured by a certain type of Protestant fundamentalism. He does not, apparently, even consider himself a sectarian secularist. In the "personal prologue" to his new book, *God and Man in Washington*, he writes: "I have tried to preserve in these pages a point of view that is neither secularist nor sectarian, a point of view appropriate for a tolerant liberal democrat who believes in the practice of freedom in a pluralistic society." But the title of Mr. Blanshard's "personal prologue" is "The Church-State Battlefront," so as we start the book we know we are entering once more upon the same old war. We know also that in this war General Blanshard will no doubt give God a very rough time.

God and Man in Washington provides us with Mr. Blanshard's view of those areas of the national "battlefront" where the cause of democracy is in greatest peril from the assaults of religion. He surveys the battle in the Supreme Court (where "Man" seems to be holding his own) and in Congress (where "God" has apparently placed some undercover agents); but his major attention, in the pre-convention period of 1960, is centered on the White House. It is here, he thinks, that the issue will be decided.

Not that Mr. Blanshard is a "bigot"; he assures us that his "personal conviction is that several [*sic*] of the Catholic aspirants are quite worthy as individuals of being President of the United States." But, he writes, "their individual qualities can scarcely be appraised in isolation. To some extent they are bound to be scrutinized and assessed as representatives of a Church which is also a State with a world-wide political and social program." And as much as Mr. Blanshard may approve "several" Catholic Presidential aspirants *individually*, he is clearly not optimistic about any assessment of them as "representatives" of the Roman Church. (I wonder why Catholic citizens are forever being considered as "representatives of" or "spokesmen for" the Church?) He writes that, if a Catholic candidate accepts the teachings of his Church "literally" he cannot accept the prevailing American concept of the separation of Church and State:

> "If he believes in freedom of choice as the foundation of all democracy, he must somehow square that conviction with the system of dictation under which [Church] policies are imposed on Catholics by fiat. If he is faced with searching questions about [the Church's] policies, and if he answers them candidly, he will be compelled to reject the basic principles of American democracy or to assert an independence which his Church's hierarchy will interpret as contrary to Catholic teaching."

In other words, the Catholic candidate will have had it either way. Under Mr. Blanshard's prescription for democracy, he can qualify for President only if he repudiates the "official teaching" of the Church. But if he does this, he will almost certainly lose "the Catholic vote."

The comfort a Catholic candidate can take, of course, is from the fact that Mr. Blanshard's book is not serious – even though it is obviously sincere. Indeed, the failure of this book, as of Mr. Blanshard's previous books, lies not in its lack of sincerity, or even of subjective good will, but in its lack of intelligence, its seeming inability to make the most fundamental philosophical discriminations. Mr. Blanshard simply cannot grasp (God knows it has been pointed out to him *ad nauseam* by his critics) the basic distinctions between society and religion, State and Church, Caesar and God. He has one criterion for all of life – a monster-like, majoritarian "democracy," which first defines then devours any force which makes a counter-claim against it. In Mr. Blanshard's commonwealth, society determines religion, the State measures the Church, Caesar commands God. Mr. Blanshard, in brief, is the totalitarian liberal *par excellence.*

Nothing could indicate this more effectively – or, I think, more pathetically – than Mr. Blanshard's statement, quoted above, that if a Catholic "believes in freedom of choice as the foundation of all democracy, he must somehow square that conviction with the system of dictation under which [Church] policies are imposed on Catholics by fiat." In other words, Mr. Blanshard cannot understand how a man can accept democracy on the *political* level and still accept the authority of a teaching Church on the spiritual level. Nor, in Mr. Blanshard's "democracy," would there be room for such a man; everyone would be an ecclesiastical as well as a civil democrat, or else be excommunicated from the "free" society. It is no wonder that in such a "democracy" we are doomed to constant struggle on a "Church-State Battlefront."

There are real problems, yet to be solved, for Catholics in the liberal, post-Christian society; but, as Jacques Maritain remarked when Mr. Blanshard's *American Freedom and Catholic Power* was first published, they are not the problems Mr. Blanshard writes about. The problems that exist for Catholics in the United States are much more historical-sociological than theological. They involve an immigrant defensiveness that still lingers on – sometimes powerfully – in sections of the Catholic community, especially in some of the large cities of the Eastern seaboard. This heritage leads Catholics too easily into power struggles in defense of values which they legitimately hold, but could quite legitimately advance in ways more appropriate both for the Church and for the democratic society. The Catholic intellectual community has still to enter more profoundly into the democratic dialogues of our age. The Catholic Church itself has still to advance "officially" a doctrine of tolerance which

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does justice to its own profound convictions on the inviolability of the human conscience and the radical freedom of the human will.

But these things are proceeding, even though Paul Blanshard seems not even to guess they have begun. In the meantime, if only to speed, rather than confuse, these movements, one wishes that those American secular-liberal humanists who feel concern over the role of Catholics in American life would find a more philosophically sophisticated, historically discriminating spokesman for their fears than the writer of *God and Man in Washington.*

Of Youths and Elephants

by Susan M. Black

Two Weeks in Another Town
by Irwin Shaw
(Random House; $4.95)

The other town is Rome and the main character does, in fact, spend fourteen days there. As the book opens, Jack Andrus, a man in his middle-forties, is saying his goodbyes – to Hélène (his third and current wife), to Paris (his current home) and to NATO (his current employer). A voice from out of the past, which belongs to his old friend Maurice Delaney, has beckoned; Andrus has decided to answer the call. Andrus and Delaney were young and talented together in the flamboyant Hollywood of the 1930's. A jaw injury incurred in World War II put an abrupt end to Andrus' career as a movie actor. Delaney, now a director, is now making third rate movies in Rome. He needs Andrus for professional and personal reasons: to save his latest film by dubbing in the soundtrack for its handsome but inarticulate sot of a star, and to save his reputation, whose decline parallels that of his movies. Andrus goes to Rome for the $5,000 he will be paid for his two weeks of work; he goes out of friendship for Delaney and out of boredom with his minor bureaucrat-type job which is good but not good enough and in which he cannot become truly "involved"; but he goes mainly because he feels that if he can rescue Delaney, he can rescue the best of what he once was. "It's going to be a crowded two weeks," Jack says.

This is a prophetic understatement, for the weeks are more than crowded – they are chaotic. A punch on the nose delivered by a drunken stranger on his first day in Rome starts the blood flowing ominously. (Andrus bleeds more psychically than physically thereafter). On his second day in town he acquires a mistress and this brief affair brings together Andrus and Bresach, the girl's former lover, with whom Andrus will have a lengthy affair of the mind.

By day Andrus lives strange events. And if it were not enough to live by day, he must dream by night. As if it were not enough to dream of the American and Italian movie people he meets in Rome, he must relive other chapters of his past; he must be haunted by several dead Hollywood associates and two very alive ex-wives. After these two strenuous weeks Andrus returns to Hélène, to Paris, to NATO.

Irwin Shaw is not a lazy writer: he has created many minor and major characters; he has described them all deftly and he has given them a more than generous amount of things to say and do. Had his only desire been to entertain us, I would have praised his sparkling dialogue, good plotting and vast cast of interesting characters at greater length; I would have confined my unfavorable remarks to two comments in passing: I found the book a little too slick, and a little too loudly organized. But to overlook the thoughtfulness, the contemplative insight in this novel is almost impossible. And to see these things is to realize that the author falls short – alas – of the larger goal he seems to have had in mind.

We can account for every minute of Andrus' time in Rome and for almost every lira: the 10,000 lire given to him on page 25 for suffering the drunken punch in silence is spent on page 370 for gifts for his wife and children. But when Shaw, the analyst, delves beneath the surface, there is a disturbing amount of confusion. What are Andrus' reasons for deciding to return to Paris at the very last minute, a decision which strikes us as an anti-climax? Does his decision reflect determination or resignation? Is his return a decision at all or merely another "accident"? Have his two weeks in Rome taught him that a NATO job is more meaningful than one in movies so that he goes back to become "involved"? Or does he learn that only the young can do great work in films so that he goes back only because the older must settle for less than best? Shaw's characters talk intelligently of war and peace, of life and death but their actions betray them: they are unable to understand their own words.

According to Leonardo da Vinci – after Pliny, adjusted by Shaw,

> "The great elephant has by nature qualities which are rarely found in man, namely honesty, prudence, a sense of justice, and of religious observance. Consequently, when the moon is new they go down to the rivers and there solemnly cleansing themselves bathe, and after having thus saluted the planet they return to the woods.
> "They fear shame and only pair at night and secretly, nor do they then rejoin the herd but first bathe in the river."

Only once, by sleeping with his adulterous ex-wife Carlotta does Andrus' conduct begin to approach the high level of conduct of the elephant. Never is he to triumph over the subject of Catullus' warning, the book's second classical refrain: "Look, where the youths are coming. . . ."

In my book, youth has no monopoly on integrity and man does compare favorably with the elephants; in Mr. Shaw's book this is not the case.

Notes on Contributors

David Riesman, *the distinguished sociologist and author, is on the faculty of Harvard.* William Clancy *is the editor of* Worldview *and consultant to the Fund for the Republic's study "Religion in a Democratic Society."* Susan M. Black *lives in New York where she works for* Esquire *magazine.* Wilfred E. Binkley *teaches political science at Ohio Northern University.*

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The Assistants to the Presidents

by Wilfred E. Binkley

Claude Bowers' partisan exaltation of Jefferson over Hamilton in his well-documented *Jefferson and Hamilton* of a generation ago is now countered by this undocumented publication. Here Jefferson cuts a miserable figure as compared with Hamilton. In 1775 General Washington summons young Hamilton

The Invisible Presidency
by Louis W. Koenig
(Rhinehart, $6.95)

to be his *aide-de-camp*. "Straight as a battle spear, his uniform immaculate, his face handsome in an imperial way, he was made to command." As to Jefferson: "He dressed like a beggar, even for affairs of state, in worn-out clothes and carpet slippers whose effects were exaggerated by his slouch and outrageous manner of sitting." Thus he would "survey the room with the distant majesty of a misplaced gargoyle."

Eighteen years later with these two new members of Washington's Cabinet the President must decide whether or not to receive Edmond Genet, as minister from revolutionary France. Hamilton would receive him and hold him strictly to account. "Jefferson in halting terms . . . expounded his opinions. It was a sad performance, disconnected, confused as to facts, blinded by cobwebs of sophistry. Hamilton drove him into corners and easily polished him off with quick thrusts of his invincible logic. The ordeal which made minutes seem like hours ended only when Jefferson, his glance rolling wildly everywhere, let his remarks trail off into incoherent gasps." Even if every item here could be documented, it would sound more like campaign propaganda than a serious treatise on the Presidency.

Koenig's *Invisible Presidency* is a new approach to the great office through case studies of seven informal assistants to Presidents. With the exception of Hamilton, all are treated with commendable objectivity. It would be virtually impossible to draw any generalization since each assistant is decidedly *sui generis*. For example Martin Van Buren, President Jackson's assistant, certainly earned the title of the "Little Magician" given him by his contemporaries. There never was another American statesman who could feather his nest so comfortably while faithfully serving his President and devising effective party strategy. He asked Jackson to give him charge of the horde of patronage seekers and at once order prevailed. At the very height of the uproar over nullification Van Buren calmly proposed as a banquet toast, "Mutual forebearance and reciprocal concessions" which forecast Clay's Compromise of 1830. By 1836, having safely run the political rapids, he floated serenely into the White House.

Just inaugurated as Governor of New York, Theodore Roosevelt called from his office, "Send me a good stenographer." The clerical staff quailed at the thought of taking dictation from the terrible Teddy – all but a part-time secretary, William Loeb, Jr. The next day Roosevelt asked for "that stenographer I had yesterday." Before long the Governor made the part-time Loeb permanent by increasing his pay out of his own pocket. In 1901 Loeb followed Roosevelt into the White House where he demonstrated competence far beyond that of an expert stenographer. He proved to be adept at "preserving peace between the White House and the executive department." Before long Roosevelt had him promoting administration bills in the Congress. In 1908 Loeb largely managed the delegates who nominated Taft.

How such a self-willed President as Wilson ever fell under the spell of Colonel House is still a mystery. By his visits to "Berlin and London in 1914" this "Sphinx in a Soft Hat" "almost prevented the World War," declared H. S. Vierick. By unobtrusive flattery House obtained an almost hypnotic control of Wilson. When Wilson could not manage to keep House in Washington he frequently traveled to his home in New York for conferences. Wilson's fourteen points were essentially House's. After his relations with Wilson deteriorated, the Sphinx concluded: "He is one of the most difficult and complex characters I have ever known. He is so contradictory that it is hard to pass judgment on him."

Machiavelli was the avowed guiding philosopher of Thomas Corcoran, one of Franklin Roosevelt's chief aids. Corcoran had been one of the bright young Harvard law graduates to serve a year as clerk under Associate Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, and Holmes averred he was the brightest of them all. He was probably the best of Roosevelt's speech writers. His ingenuity was inexhaustible; he could work the clock around on urgent administration projects. Deeply concerned about the underdog, he once told Gifford Pinchot, in an outburst of extravagant language, that his idea of relief would be for a fleet of airplanes to fly over the countryside discharging money as they went so that anyone needing cash could pick it up.

"His was a soul that flamed out of a frail and fading body," observed Churchill of Harry Hopkins. "He was a crumbling light house from which there shone the beams that led great fleets to harbor." Hopkins was a catalyzer persistently prodding procrastinating FDR to make up his mind. This invalid had the irrepressible energy of Theodore Roosevelt but functioned far more effectively. So much did Franklin Roosevelt depend on Hopkins that he kept him three and a half years in the White House (to the dismay of Mrs. Roosevelt)

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– much of the time in the Lincoln room as a bed ridden invalid. Sometimes Hopkins would arouse himself from what seemed his death bed to tame the irrepressible La Guardia or some other public man. Once, at Downing Street, he brought a somewhat garrulous Churchill suddenly back to the purpose of the conference – the defeat of Hitler. One has to read the incredible record again to believe it.

It was President Eisenhower's aversion to governmental details that made Sherman Adams virtually acting President. He set out to shield Eisenhower especially after his illness, and sometimes he overdid it, as when Eisenhower cried out concerning a perplexing matter just raised at a news conference, "Why didn't someone tell me about this?" So assiduous was Adams that, like Corcoran, he occasionally used two phones simultaneously, one at each ear. He would ease or harry cabinet members into and out of office. Koening shrewdly surmises that Adams' becoming so wrapped up in his job and so isolated from the outside world may explain his obtuseness as to the implications of his disastrous relations with Goldfine. Whatever the reasons, Adams is the only one of these court favorites who experienced so conspicuous and inglorious an exit.

ART

What is Painting All About?

Not so much overlooked as put to one side were three books on art of the last season that distinguished themselves chiefly by having a good deal to say about art in general. Two of them have no illustrations at all except on the dust jackets: Eliot's reproduces an Albers "Homage to the Square" painting; Rosenberg's has the title painted in white letters on black by De Kooning,

Ideas and Images in World Art
by René Huyghe
(Abrams; $15)

The Tradition of the New
by Harold Rosenberg
(Horizon; $4.95)

Sight and Insight
by Alexander Eliot
(McDowell, Obolensky; $3.50)

once legibly, once illegibly. The third, René Huyghe's *Ideas and Images*, is on the contrary loaded with reproduced art, 400 illustrations, 15 of them in color. But the images have been chosen to illustrate the ideas, not to inspire them, and the layout of the book is a miracle of coordination between developing thought and examples.

For the serious student of painting, it is hard to imagine a better overall guide to the art than Huyghe offers. His approach is not historical; he does not believe for a moment that painting, given a great flying start by Giotto, has progressed steadily to the heights we occupy today. His organization is rather based on the orderly examination of the things painting can do, the things it has been called upon to do, the things it has been said to do and the means, social and psychological as well as technical, by which all these things have been done. Within any part of this examination he can move easily from the Renaissance to yesterday afternoon. Thus the entire history of art is covered but it is covered in pieces and the pieces are integrated into the general examination. Huyghe, honorary chief curator at the Louvre and professor at the College of France, makes much use of Delacroix, both as artist and as aesthetician. The great romantic comes into the book with a casual, "Take Delacroix, for example," and never really gets out again. But Huyghe is not confined to Delacroix' preferences by a long shot. Almost every theory of art gets in sooner or later. It is Huyghe's supreme virtue, I think, to use them all for their value in understanding certain works of art or groups of artists, to extract from them what really does apply to art in general, and to show the varying degrees of disaster that follow making any theory the philosopher's stone of art. Similarly, he stresses that art has become self-conscious, it wasn't always so, and it is extremely risky to understanding to project backwards interests that are recent results of self-consciousness.

Huyghe's book is a work of high scholarship, the scholarship that makes a new whole out of long attention to details treated necessarily as if they were everything. Neither Eliot nor Rosenberg is a scholar at all. Each is an enthusiast, an apologist, a publicist you might say if it weren't for the shady associations that honorable old word has picked up since going into business for itself. Eliot is concerned with all art, with the pleasures and revelations it holds and therefore with the lamentable fact that for most people it doesn't really exist. What he wants to do is to grab you by the arm and march you to the nearest art museum, there to plant you in front of any great painting and somehow beguile you into looking at it. Rosenberg is more exclusively concerned with American painting of the last fifteen years which has concentrated on the actions of the painter as both the subject and the style of art. What he wants to do is not really to get you to look at such painting as simply to admit that such painting is wonderfully suited to the times we live in and further that while all other painting is dead American action painting is alive.

Actually only one fourth of *The Tradition of the New* is about action painting, and why, in that fourth, Rosenberg is so insistent upon the supremacy of the form – or lack of form – is beyond me. One of the historical necessities that created action painting, he says, was the need to get art out of the service of politics; yet elsewhere in the book, particularly in the last half, Rosenberg himself brilliantly weaves together the art, literature, politics, sociology and psychology of our time; nor is that all; in the section on action painting itself he very perceptively describes the institutional and social phenomena that surround action painting and help make it a highly dubious reality. He points out, even insists, that the only goal in action painting is the achievement or self-recognition on the part of the actionist. In common charity we should all be concerned with anyone's struggle for self-recognition. We cannot

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but wish the actors well, but unlike art these gaudy soul-searchings have nothing for anyone else except the tired businessmen – more of them all the time – who take the self-recognition in action painting as they used to take up golf.

In the heat of his enthusiasm, Rosenberg attempts to steal the disfavor of naïve Congressman for his actionists; it is therefore worth recalling that Congressmen have never seriously attacked action painters; the artists named and denounced in Congress are the same ones denounced by Rosenberg, the urban realists and painters of social comment. Interestingly enough, this same kind of historical steal is lucidly outlined in a first rate essay on what Rosenberg calls the "couch liberalism" evoked by the violence of McCarthy. The book is full of insights and reasoned analyses of art and the times; one of the most important is unexpressed: that the finest artistic achievements of action painting are the essays of Harold Rosenberg collected in this volume.

For me the most telling deficiency in Rosenberg's apologia for action is that in over 80 pages he doesn't actually name one specific work, let alone describe it. Eliot's book, written for a wider audience, is built upon the loving evocation of a series of individual paintings. These evocations are contained in a meditation on the ends and means of art in relation to all of man's life and destiny. This is tricky stuff to handle, which explains why it usually isn't, but Eliot keeps it in control, partly through a conscious style that reminds you of no one so much as G. K. Chesterton.

Frank Getlein

THEATER

Krapp and a Little Claptrap

Krapp's Last Tape
by Samuel Beckett

The Zoo Story
by Edward Albee
(Provincetown Playhouse)

Krapp's Last Tape is Samuel Beckett's latest, and very possibly his best, dramatic poem about the old age of the world. Still obsessed with the alienation, vacuity, and decay of life upon a planet devoid of God and hope, Beckett is finally able to sound those chords of compassion which have always vibrated quietly in his other work. Yet, what really strikes me as new is the extraordinary economy of the writing, the absolute flawlessness of the form. *Godot* and *Endgame*, for all their great poetry and insight, were ultimately marred, I think, by their length. It is one thing to affirm that life is a string of aimless, inconsequential, and monotonous events; it is quite another to produce and reproduce these events upon the stage. Although Beckett's art, like Ionesco's, lends itself most readily to short statements, the burden of his plays – that one day is very much like another – has led him into labyrinths of *longueur* and repetition.

In *Krapp*, Beckett disposes of this problem with the aid of a simple mechanical device. Today and tomorrow are, through the use of a tape recorder, simultaneously revealed. Set in the future (I suspect all of Beckett's plays are), this brief and beautiful art-work revolves around a solitary character, the perfect realization of Beckett's idea of human isolation. Like so many of the author's creations, Krapp is incredibly ancient. He putters laboriously around his hermetic cell, myopically examining his keys, peering dimly into his books, testing his shrunken vocal organs on words which please him, pouring whiskey noisily down his throat, sucking toothlessly on a banana with the same relish and resignation that Estragon eats his carrot and Nagg his soda biscuit. Reduced to his most elementary appetites, Krapp has no purpose or occupation except to listen to his organs die and to feel his functions fail. He is, like Eliot's Gerontion, "an old man in a draughty house under a windy knob," but he is without even Gerontion's dream of rain.

Krapp is surrounded, almost buried, by his past – boxes upon boxes of magnetic tapes, the vocal diary of his entire life. The action of the play is the replaying of one spool, a mundane yesterday recorded 30 years before when Krapp was middle-aged and already rather juiceless. The droning, slightly pompous voice from the machine evokes a variety of responses from the aged Krapp; anger, interest, melancholy, contempt, despair. A memory of feeling returns to his withered hand during a description of the texture of a black rubber ball; after the story of a girl in a tattered dress glimpsed on a railway platform, he hurriedly plays the section over; he turns the set off in disgust in the midst of a rabid, excited account of a eureka insight into the meaning of life; he collapses into ruins of longing during the indifferently intoned narrative of a sexual experience in a rocking boat. On the last tape, Krapp intends to record his present day's activities, but there is now nothing left in him, "not a squeak," nothing but memory, loss, and impotent desire, nothing to do but put on the old tape and eavesdrop on his past when he could still press his flesh against another human body. The curtain descends on Krapp stiffening in his rented room, his head laid miserably on the machine, his arms around it like a grotesque and wizened lover. It is a haunting and harrowing work, brilliantly directed by Allen Schneider and played by Donald Davis with just the right balance of pathos and absurdity.

Accompanying Beckett's play at the Provincetown is an underground work by Edward Albee called *The Zoo Story*, a colloquy between a well-dressed bench sitter and a psychotic hipster who accosts him in the park. Out of this dialogue – or, rather, monologue (for the hipster does the talking while the bench sitter responds with raised eyebrows) – comes a convoluted story about the hipster's inability to connect with human beings. A brief account of his sexual failures with both men and women leads to a longer account of his relationship with animals, particularly his landlady's dog which he tried to poison because this "black monster of a beast" was always making vicious passes at his leg. The murder, despite elaborate preparations, does not come off ("I wanted the dog to live so that I could see what our relationships would come to"); in-

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stead, the hipster experiences a kind of pseudo-Zen religious conversion. Realizing that his attempt to kill, along with the dog's effort to bite, was really an expression of love, he begins to see God everywhere: in the Negro queen who lives above him, in his lecherous landlady, even in the pornographic playing cards he keeps in his room. And, undoubtedly to prove his love for the bench sitter, he expropriates his bench, punches him in the ribs, maligns his manhood – goads him, in other words, into holding a knife on which he gratefully impales himself. Having scared the poor bench sitter half out of his wits, the hipster tells him, "Now you know what you see on your TV," frees him from the charge of being a vegetable, commends himself to God, and dies.

I should report immediately that portions of this play are extremely well-written. The bench sitter is less a character than an idea (Mr. Square, straw man of the Beat Generation) so *The Zoo Story* lacks a convincing antagonist; but the dialogue, suspense, and sheer narrative flow of the work indicate that Mr. Albee, who is no Broadway sibling, has a powerful dramatic talent. On the other hand, I am deeply depressed by the uses to which this talent has been put. In its implicit assumption that the psychotic, the criminal and the invert are closer to God than anyone else, *The Zoo Story* embodies the same kind of sexual-religious claptrap we are accustomed to from Allen Ginsberg. The tendency of Beat writers to invest the French Rebel tradition (de Sade - Rimbaud - Jean Genet) with a pseudo-religious flavor seems to me quite similar to the tendency of Broadway playwrights to identify romantic love with God; and although such ideas may endear these writers to the Luce publications, they signifiy general flabbiness in American feeling and thought. I will not bore you with a discussion of the masochistic-homosexual perfume which hangs so heavily over *The Zoo Story* except to say that Mr. Albee's love-death, like Mr. Ginsberg's poetry, yields more readily to clinical than theological analysis. In short, Mr. Albee has successfully avoided Broadway stereotypes only to fall into Beat ideology, and Jack Gelber remains the only new American dramatist steering a clear path between the two.

ROBERT BRUSTEIN

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Correspondence

The New Republic *welcomes communications in regard to subjects of current interest. Those of 300 words or less are most suitable for publication.*

The Population Explosion

Sirs:

I am writing to you concerning a TV documentary, entitled "The Population Explosion," which was retelecast recently by popular demand on CBS.

As an Indian, now residing in the United States, I am deeply concerned with the population issue. As a socioligist, I know that people hold different opinions about birth control and that often their opinions are dictated by their religious persuasion. However, in a dispassionate public debate, I expect the social scientist to conduct himself according to the canons of science, not dogma. So I would like to comment on the panel debate at the end of the program, especially on the statements made by Professor Colin Clark of Oxford University.

Professor Clark chastized CBS for stating that two-thirds of the world lived in hunger and squalor today, when his own calculations showed otherwise. The burden of his argument was that these people were not really hungry in the sense of "starving" (as if any starving person would live for more than a few days!) His next point was that if people bred more children they would produce more and this would lead to economic growth; therefore, he was 100 percent "in favor of explosion of the population bomb."

Now Colin Clark is an internationally renowned economist and perhaps an expert on demography, but I wonder how he has kept insulated from some of the recent population studies. What reason has he to believe that the larger the family, the greater the motivation to produce? Or can he marshall any proof that the individual having a larger number of children produces more than the one who has less or one who is unmarried. His argument about the increase in population in Great Britain leading to its expansion into America and Australia, and the giant economic progress of these countries is the least convincing either in terms of its logic or its application to the now industrializing countries. It assumes the existence of a particular type of political and economic structure, which is neither available nor can be easily replicated in the newly developing countries.

One last point about birth control and food production. It is unfortunate that some people equate the two issues, as if there would be no need for birth control in the coming decades if means were found to feed somehow the present growing population of the world. We forget that people of *all countries* desire something more than food. They want a level of living which can be called decent by civilized standards. This is not an "itch for the grandiose" (as Professor Clark would have it) and even if it is, I do not see why underdeveloped countries with exploding populations should not be allowed to initiate measures which can help them in competing with their industrialized peers in this respect.

Baidya Nath Varma
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Subsidies for Schools

Sirs:

The exact point of "Subsidies for Schools" (February 8) is not clear to me. If your writer had served ten years on his local board of education, as some of us have done, and if he were an assiduous student of social trends in the United States, it would be plain to him that local control, *per se*, is not *the cause* of the sorry plight of present day public education.

As a school board member, I saw the paralyzing effect upon local communities of the first hint, hope, promise, or threat of federal aid to education. It precipitated a condition of suspended animation, such as a mud dauber inflicts upon a spider by its sting, in which people simply said, "Oh well, let's wait, and see what Congress is 'a-going-a' do!" Meanwhile, school boards were going crazy trying to find storage space for the annual crop of human progeny which the bobby-sox mamas were hatching with lapinarian abandon.

For 40 years I have known and proclaimed that the district school is doomed, that the county unit will be anachronistic before its adoption becomes widespread, and that even state units, possibly excepting a very few states, will be ineffective. I doubt now the capacity of the foundations and the national government combined to cope with the problem, seeing that all other socio-political functions are as sick as education. Even in Washington, one can see the choking effects of demographic agglomeration upon most aspects of life, if one will only look at them. It is a national crisis, not a local calamity, which bedevils us.

Otis Durant Duncan
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

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